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IN THE SUPRE~1E COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY A. ZIEGLER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
vJILLIAM MILLIKEN and 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 
15533 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff-appellant is appealing the dismissal 
of his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, by the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The court below granted the respondent's motion to 
dismiss the petition because the writ is not the proper avenue 
in Utah to challenge the administrative processes of the prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an affirmance of the decision 
of the lower court. 
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STATEHENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, a prisoner at the Utah State 
Prison, initiated this action pro se by filing two 
virtually identical pleadings entitled "A petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus" (R.l-13). Those pleadings 
contained no prayer for relief, nor has any subsequent 
pleading. The appellant alleges that he has been 
subjected to conditions at the prison that constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment. He also alleges denial 
of due process, religious discrimination, denial of 
access to legal materials, denial of access to the 
mails, and physical abuse. No allegations were made 
regarding the processes that led to his conviction, 
or that he has made an effort to seek redress by any 
other means. 
On September 15, 1977, the application and motion 
to dismiss were heard by the Third District Court, l·lith 
the appellant now represented by Randall Gaither. No 
witnesses were called and the parties argued the role of 
65B{i) and 65B(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in 
the application (T.l-4), the unavailability of the writ to 
challenge prison conditions (T.S-9), and the availability 
of other means of redress (T.9-ll). Counsel were requested 
to submit memoranda on the points argued, and on November 
2, 1977, the court granted the respondents' motion for 
-2-
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dismissal (R.3l). The court based its decision on Utah 
case law and the availability of relief both before the 
Board of Corrections and under 42 u.s.c. § 1983. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT GENERALLY AVAILABLE TO 
CHALLENGE THE CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT IN THE STATE PRISON. 
The Great Writ of Habeas Corpus is one of the 
cornerstones of democracy, a traditional remedy that 
has been administered with initiative and flexibility 
in the courts. Because of the important role it has 
played in the development of constitutional law, it 
should be used in a discriminate manner. The primary 
use of the writ has been to seek release of persons 
actuallyincustody, by challenging the conditions that 
led to their imprisonment. Currently, there is a 
developing body of case law that recognizes the use of 
the Great Writ to challenge the conditions of a prisoner's 
confinement. See Summary in Armstrong v. Cardwell, 457 
F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1972). With the increased recognition 
being given to the constitutional rights of prisoners, 
the writ is certain to become an important instrument in 
the protection of these rights. 
-3-
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"The writ is not now and never has been a 
static, narrow, formalistic remedy." Peyton v. Rowe, 
391 u.s. at 66 (1968). The real issue presented in 
this case is under what circumstances might habeas 
corpus be available to the state prisoner to challenge 
the constitutionality of the conditions of his confinement. 
While there are still many jurisdictions that 
adhere firmly to thE position that habeas corpus is not 
available to challenge anything other than the conditions 
precedent to confinement, Dutton v. Eyman, 95 Ariz. 96, 
387 P.2d 799, cert. denied 377 u.s. 913 (1963), Bishop v.----j 
Sheriff, Clark County, 88 Nev. 441, 498 P.2d 1340 (1972), 
or that it is not available in the absence of a statute 
authorizing its use, In re Application of Dunn, 150 Neb. 669, 
35 N.W.2d 673 (1949), the Utah Supreme Court has maintained 
a consistent position that the Great Writ is available to 
challenge the conditions of confinement only in a "rare 
case" in which the petitioner has been subjected to cruel 
and unusual punishment. Chapman v. Graham, 2 Utah 2d 156, 
270 P.2d 821 (1954); Smith v. Turner, 12 Utah 2d 66, 362 
P.2d 581 (1961). 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure deal with the 
use of habeas corpus in Rules 65B(i) and 65B(f). It is 
clear that Rule 65B(i) is not available to the prisoner to 
-4-
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challenge anything other than the proceedings which resulted 
in his commitment. However, under Rule 65B(f}, "habeas 
corpus proceedings shall be granted whenever it appears 
to the proper court that any person is unjustly imprisoned 
or otherwise restrained of his liberty." The balance of 
65B(f} lists the conditions under which habeas corpus will 
be granted. It seems that in that "rare case" when habeas 
corpus is available to challenge conditions of imprisonment, 
Rule 65B(f} is the appropriate section. 
The mere availability of habeas corpus to the 
prisoner to challenge the conditions of confinement should 
not mean that it be used as a general remedy. The Great 
Writ is one that should be used sparingly. It has 
traditionally been used to correct conditions that society 
finds outrageous or clearly against its moral standards. 
Weems v. United States, 217 u.s. 349 (1910}. While numerous 
courts, state and federal, recognize the availability of the 
Writ, its actual use has been severely limited. Among the 
key factors that have been considered by the courts in 
applications for the Writ are the availability of other 
relief, and the likelihood that the conditions complained 
of will continue. In the Oregon Appellate case of Newton v. 
Cupp, 30 Or.App. 434, 474 P.2d 532 (1970), the plaintiff 
alleged a number of brutal beatings, and the likelihood 
-5-
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that they would continue. The court there addressed many 
of the problems attendant to the relief of habeas corpus, 
but addressed a key issue when it stated "to hold that 
habeas corpus is also unavailable would be to leave the 
petitioner in the medieval position of possessing a right 
for which there exists no remedy." Newton, supra, at 535, 
By so stating, the Oregon court recognized the limited 
availability of civil remedies to the prisoner to protect 
his constitutional rights. The Oregon court also discussed 
two other problems that are of significance. First, the 
need of the prison to place reasonable limits on some 
freedoms to maintain order in the prison and protect the 
lives of employees and other inmates. Second, that 
release from imprisonment is not the only available remedy 
in a habeas corpus action; corrective measures may be 
sufficient relief. Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 
1967). 
None of the cases cited by the appellant in his 
brief stand for that proposition that habeas corpus is 
generally available for the relief sought by appellant. In 
the Oregon case, Newton, supra, the prisoner was trapped 
by a conflict in Oregon statutes which severely restricted 
his remedies. The federal courts have granted habeas 
-6-
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corpus to prisoners in instances where prison regulations 
have effectively eliminated any other means of redress. 
Johnson v. Avery, 393 u.s. 483 (1969). In Bryant v. Harris, 
465 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1972), where the petitioners had been 
in solitary confinement for as long as 230 days, and prison 
policy worked a severe limitation on religious freedom, the 
court found that habeas corpus may be available. In 
Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941), the prison had a regula-
tion that prohibited an inmate application for habeas corpus 
without prior approval by prison officials. The court held 
only that the application for the writ cannot be regulated---~~--~ 
at the prison. In at least two California cases, In Re 
Allison, 57 Cal.Rptr. 593, 425 P.2d 193, cert. denied 389 
U.S. 876 (1967), and In Re Riddle, 22 Cal.Rptr. 472, 372 
P.2d 304, cert. denied 371 u.s. 914 (1926), the court 
recognized the availability of habeas corpus to challenge 
prison conditions, but read the use of that remedy to be 
available only upon a proper showing of cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
The federal and state courts that have granted 
hearings on conditions of confinement have done so where 
the petitioner's other remedies were effectively foreclosed, 
or where further attempts at relief were futile because of 
-7-
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lack of assurances that their claims would be heard else-
where. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971). These 
conditions do not exist in the immediate case. The 
application for the writ has been often considered, but 
seldom granted. 
In the instant case there is no evidence that 
the petitioner has made any effort to seek administrative 
relief, or relief through any other remedy. There is a 
growing body of case law which indicates that 42 u.s.c. 
§ 1983 is a more appropriate measure of relief in these 
circumstances than a writ of habeas corpus. The _availabilii, 
of this remedy has been recognized by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Kish v. Wright, 525 P.2d 625 (Utah 1977), as an action ili 
can properly be initiated within the jurisdiction of the sta: 
If the action is brought in federal court, the 
petitioner need not have exhausted his state court remedies. 
Wilwording v. Swenson, supra. In addition, he need not 
request "total release" as a remedy. The use of Section 
1983 makes available injunctive or declaratory relief and 
damages, as well as the potential for class actions. In 
the instant case, where the petitioner asserts a claim 
of violation of his constitutional rights, Section 1983 
would provide a more effective remedy. 
-8-
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The petitioner does have other forms of relief 
available to him other than habeas corpus. These include 
administrative remedies as well as suits under 42 u.s.c. 
§ 1983. The petitioner has made no effort to seek these 
remedies, and he has a duty to do so. Chapman, supra. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND OTHER STATE SUPREME 
COURTS HAVE ESTABLISHED THE CRITERIA UNDER WHICH A 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WILL BE CONSIDERED 
WHEN CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT ARE CHALLENGED. 
In Smith, supra, the Utah Supreme Court acknow-
ledged the need of the prisoner to direct an appeal to the 
warden or to the Board of Corrections to allow them an 
opportunity to take action if they deem it merited by the 
conditions alleged. The Kansas Supreme Court, in a very 
well reasoned case, Levier v. State, 209 Kan. 442, 497 P.2d 
265 (1972), accepted this requirement as a prerequisite to 
an application for the writ. The Kansas court went further 
when it said at 273 that "the particular type of administrative 
procedure to be employed should be left to the sound discretion 
of correctional authorities so as to accommodate the needs of 
the penal system as well as the interests of the inmates." 
The proceeding must afford the inmate the basic elements 
of due process. 
-9-
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It is a generally accepted rule that prisoners 
are entitled to the protection of their constitutional 
rights, even while imprisoned. Logan v. United States, 
144 u.s. 263 (1896); Levier, supra. But at the same 
time, the fundamental distinction between free citizens 
and those who have lawfully been subjected to imprison-
ment cannot be ignored. Courts have universally held 
that they should not substitute their judgment for 
that of prison officials, Smith, supra; Hughes v. Turner, 
14 Utah 2d 128, 378 P.2d 888 (1963); and as long as the 
punishment imposed is not so unreasonable as to be 
characterized as vindictive, cruel or inhuman, there 
should be no right of judicial review. Roberts v. Pegelow, 
313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963). Disciplinary measures 
properly administered in accord with reasonable prison 
regulations are not subject to judicial review. Levier, 
supra at 272. It must be kept in mind that prison official~ 
face unique problems in the area of discipline, and condi-
tions imposed by them to remedy a situation should not be 
subject to constant scrutiny by the courts. Nor should the 
prisoners be allowed to test the rules by violating them 
in hope of a subsequent finding by the courts that the rules 
were constitutionally improper. In re Harrell, 87 Cal.Rptr. 
504, 470 P.2d 640, cert. denied 401 u.s. 914 (1970). This 
-10-
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possibility alone supports the requirement that the 
prisoners seek administrative relief first. This 
possiblity also supports the position of many courts that 
if the condition or restriction alleged to be violative 
of the prisoner's constitutional rights has been corrected, 
or will be corrected in the very near future, that no 
action for habeas corpus ought to lie. Armstrong, supra. 
The prisoner must be required to show that the condition 
complained of is likely to continue. Mootness is a factor 
that must be considered by the courts in this context. 
The initial showing that every prisoner should 
be compelled to make before a petition for habeas corpus 
will be considered by any court is that he has made use of 
his administrative remedies; or a clear showing that any 
effort in that direction will be futile. The prisoner 
should also be held to prove that the treatment he alleges 
is likely to continue in the absence of judicial intervention. 
At least three state supreme courts have set 
forth the procedure that must be followed by a prisoner to 
bring his petition before the courts. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court in State ex rel.Cole v. Tahash, 269 Minn. 1, 
129 N.W.2d 903 (1964), in accepting the conclusion that 
habeas corpus does exist for a prisoner challenging condi-
tions of confinement, stated at 907 that the petitioner must 
present a petition "supported by a prima facie showing of 
-11-
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cruel and unusual punishment occurring at a time and 
place and under circumstances giving rise to the inference 
that the treatment will continue or be repeated in the 
absence of judicial intervention." "The minimal requisites 
of such a showing should include a verified statement 
detailing: (a) the facts respecting the treatment claimed 
to be cruel and unusual; (b) the time and place of such 
treatment; and the identity of the person or persons 
considered responsible for it." 
The Idaho Court has also considered the procedure 
that ought to be followed in Uahaffey v. State, 87 Ida. 288, 
392 P.2d 279 (1964). The Idaho court stated at 281 that 
the petitioner "must allege facts which go beyond mere priso:. 
discipline." They then added this caveat: 
"Because of the fact that we 
may not, on an application for a writ 
of habeas corpus, dispute the veracity 
of the allegations contained in the 
petition, it is foreseeable that 
any number of fabrications could be 
employed in order that the writ 
might issue. If such tactics are 
used, this court will not hesitate 
to deal harshly, through either its 
power of contempt or by reference 
to the proper authorities for prosecu-
tion on the charge of perjury, against 
those who would employ fraud and deceit 
to win a minor legal victory. Any 
individual who attempts to make a 
mockery out of procedures designed to 
benefit the wronged is tampering with 
the very foundation of our judicial 
process and risks having additional 
punishment imposed." 
-12-
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The Kansas Court, in two opinions issued on 
May 6, 1972, Levier, supra, and Hamrick v. Hazelet, 
209 Kan. 383, 497 P.2d 273, adopted the Idaho caveat 
in Mahaffey, supra, and added the requirement that the 
petition must be accompanied by an affidavit that the 
petition is filed in good faith. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Supreme Court, as well as the United 
States Supreme Court, have recognized that the Eighth 
Amendment standards of cruel and unusual punishment are 
subject to change with the conscience of society.-
Chapman, supra; Weems, supra. To establish a firm test 
of what constitutes a prima facie showing of cruel and 
unusual would be a futile effort. In addition, the scope 
of this case does not require that one be established. 
But it is possible for the court to establish in 
explicit terms the procedure it will require to be followed 
to permit the hearing of a habeas corpus petition in the 
state courts. In this matter the court should be mindful 
that it is not its role to second-guess the actions of 
prison authorities, who are vested with broad discretion, 
unless they act unlawfully, arbitrarily, or capriciously. 
The prison officials should be allowed the opportunity to 
correct a policy through the use of administrative hearings. 
-13-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The courts should also recognize that not every gripe or 
complaint is of sufficient merit to warrant even 
administrative review. 
In the instant case, the petitioner has not made 
use of any administrative procedures, nor does he allege 
that the treatment claimed is likely to continue. In 
addition, his allegations are general in nature. Until he 
can meet the threshold requirements for seeking the writ, 
the action of the lower court in dismissing the case without 
examining the merits is proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM 1'7. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
-14-
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